You Can't Refute Model G With Model A Structural Fundamentalism

Model G is a model used in the Humanitarian Socionics School, primarily to account for its observations of the Socionics types in a way that may differ from how Model A has traditionally accounted for them (even though Model A has not really been able garner general agreement either). There are other reasons for the model, including some philosophical ideas about energy (as opposed to information socionics) that aren’t as dependent on the fashions of post-Soviet education when Socionics was being formed and that dovetail quite well with the practical approach of SHS. However, I find those reasons are often less relevant than the first more fundamental reason I mentioned (that the model is better at accounting for the observations which is really the level at which descriptive models need to be compared instead of at the level of incommensurable abstractions). Often would be “refuters” of Model G, who don’t have a disposition conducive to thinking with multiple models or to the difficult epistemological work inherent in typology, try to focus on the less important reasons for the existence Model G.

I’ll add on to this their majorly inadequate attempts to address and refute Model G that I come across, and there may be a lot of that due to the degree of belief and investment that exists in Model A.

One such attempt has already been made by Whole Socionics (Ibrahim Tencer), who can be summarily described as a Model A Structural Fundamentalist (my friend Ryan told me that Ibrahim was lazy and did not put sufficient effort into this post, but wow it was worse than I thought):

https://wholesocionics.blogspot.com/2019/11/model-g-and-how-to-fix-it.html?m=1

The title of Ibrahim's post, of course, is laughably presumptuous and sanctimonious. I guarantee you that there isn’t a single person with any competence in Model G who feels helped by Ibrahim's condescending attempt at fixing a model that he actually hasn’t studied almost at all and has never used himself. In spite of the ostensibly “helpful” attitude, it is really quite thinly veiled self-serving behavior. But that’s about as far as I need to go in psychologizing this person, since the ideas offered speak miserably enough for themselves. Here is Ibrahim's first paragraph of attempted Model G critique:

Aside from a few minor quibbles (such as the supposed difficulty of telling apart the vulnerable and role functions), I completely agree with Jack's criticisms of Model G. In short, it adds essentially nothing to Model A, is steeped in vague jargon (like "long range" and "short range", the social vs. personal spheres, etc.), and is at odds with how the types actually work (in particular how it conceives of the suggestive function as being somehow "high energy" or more prominent than the mobilizing function — or whatever they're called now).

I am pleased that Ibrahim’s version of Socionics contains the ability to distinguish between functions like the Role and Vulnerable. This is arguably not a minor quibble since being able to distinguish between the Role and Vulnerable has considerable implications for distinguishing between types and understanding the dynamics within a single type. It’s a good example of how the various versions of Model A aren’t able to agree on even basic points at times.

Let’s get to the meat of this: what exactly are Jack’s criticisms of Model G that Ibrahim agrees with?

-Attempted Criticism 1: "It adds essentially nothing to Model A"

It was never intending to add something to Model A! This "criticism" may indeed be accurate yet trivial. Surely it is self-serving (and putting the cart before the horse) to suggest that an idea needs to add something to an idea you already accept, rather than being a revision of that idea. Let’s consider an analogy of mine that Ibrahim has acknowledged, in response to this claim by Ibrahim:

But if you are doing observational science, and you have a very successful model already, then any changes you make should preserve the successes of the old model. This generally means making small, incremental changes at least on the practical level. -Ibrahim

I responded as follows:

Again, with the binary distinctions of success and not success. You mean, at best, that Model A has been successful up to a point. Take an optimization landscape with gradient descent in mathematics. Sometimes you have to seemingly take a few steps back in order to reach a better local maxima or minima, and that isn’t always obvious based on the gradual local slopes in your current location in the optimization landscape. This is why you have to apply compensating factors to stochastic gradient descent models in machine learning so that they don’t get stuck in wells. So I’m afraid that your mindset is simply irrationally decisive, even from a logico-mathematical standpoint. -me

His response:

That's conceivable of course, but again, I have evaluated Model G on other grounds and found it lacking. -Ibrahim

He is admitting the situation I describe is not able to be rationally dismissed since it is "conceivable", and thus he is admitting that the supposed failure of Model G to add-on to Model A in some kind of incremental way is not really a fair criticism with which to dismiss it. I'm not sure whether he realizes that he is admitting this, but at this point his admissions are no longer consistent with ascribing any value to the empty criticism that Model G doesn't "add" anything to Model A. Since he has failed to make a serious criticism on this point, he'll have to rely on the other grounds that he imagines to refute or fix Model G with:

-Attempted Criticism 2: "is steeped in vague jargon (like "long range" and "short range", the social vs. personal spheres, etc.)"

This is a bizarre criticism from the start because Model A is also steeped in jargon which one needs to be familiarized with in order to use it in a technical way. For example, the 3 dichotomies that make up Ibrahim's "Presence Cube" (Bold/Cautious, Strong/Weak, Valued/Unvalued) are nothing but vague false dichotomies if you don't show where we can draw the line between the poles of those dichotomies. Usually what that delineation requires is giving practical examples of how one types using the model, which funnily enough Ibrahim also acknowledges in other circumstances. The words alone can't tell us where to draw the line, and it would be silly to expect them to, so Ibrahim is just injecting an illegitimate double-standard here.

Let's look at the definitions for the concepts that Ibrahim is complaining about the vagueness of:

1) Far-close range. When interacting at a long distance, people are separated by a significant distance, their communication is largely subject to conscious and social control. This distance usually occurs between strangers or in groups of more than eight people. Close distance means that communication takes place with close contact in space and is distinguished by spontaneity (a greater degree of influence of the unconscious). This distance is most typical for groups of up to eight people, especially if they know each other well.

3) The social level of the communicative space. Most of the public communications flow at this level. It is the most formalized, the behavior of people on it is governed by many social norms, laws, treaties, customs and traditions. This level of communication subordinates the interests of the individual to the interests of society. The object of social communication does not appear as a unique person, but as a representative of a particular social stratum or professional group. At this level, a person satisfies his needs for a career, vocational training. An example of interactions at this level is labor relations (boss-subordinate, teacher-student).

Just as model A consists of the vital and mental rings, model G consists of 2 rows of 4 functions each (in earlier versions of model G, the functions were also arranged as rings). The top row is a far distance, and the bottom row is close. Extraverts have all extraverted functions at a far distance, and at a close distance all introverts, at introverts, respectively, vice versa. In practice, this means that extroverts are more active in society, and on their territory are more restrained, they accumulate energy; Introverts, on the contrary, show restraint at a distant distance, and at close range they become more active, throwing out the accumulated energy.

Jack actually accepted the above definitions as reasonable during my debate with him in which he sought to question the merit of Model G. There is no attempt to address how the definitions I just gave are any more vague than Model A descriptions like these:

Strong and Weak – Depending on our type, certain kinds of information metabolism will be strong or weak, meaning we find it easy or difficult to act on that kind of information effectively.

Valued and Subdued– Depending on our type, certain kinds of information metabolism will be valued or subdued (not valued), meaning we will appreciate those kinds of information in our surroundings or reject/avoid them.

Bold and Cautious - The Public, Demanding functions and the Private, Supplying functions (1, 3, 6, 8) are known as 'Bold' functions and are used with confidence (regardless of actual ability). These functions show up more in our personality and are easier to observe. The Public, Supplying functions and the Private, Demanding functions (2, 4, 5, 7) are known as 'Cautious' functions and are used more modestly. They can be quite subtle in a person and harder to observe. Depending on which IMEs are Bold or Cautious, a person's energy will be either high or low, making someone an Energiser or an Integrator.

To make any practical use out of definitions that make these false dichotomies out of relative concepts like strong and weak, we would need some guidance with practical examples (the definition alone is not enough to competently apply the concept). If anything, the definitions of the spheres of the communicative space as used by Model G are more precise and give more practical examples than Ibrahim's presence dichotomies do. Therefore, Ibrahim's supposed criticism is at best a double-standard used to dodge the issue of actually comparing his model to Model G, and at worst Model G is performing significantly better than Model A on this point. Model A is also prone to using these very questionable, coarse, drastic dichotomies like strong/weak to begin with, and it is not an easy thing to demonstrate that something like "strong/weak" applies to people in a binary way in relation to their functions (that also needs to be empirically established in addition to having sufficiently clear definitions, if Model A wants to make such rigid claims).

-Attempted Criticism 3: "is at odds with how the types actually work (in particular how it conceives of the suggestive function as being somehow "high energy" or more prominent than the mobilizing function — or whatever they're called now)"

This is such a clumsy mess of a criticism that it's hard to know where to start in addressing it. First of all, the names of the functions he refers to in Model G are the Dual function and the Launcher function (the fact that their names are just "whatever" to him already hints at how lackadaisical his attitude is). It has never been claimed that the Dual function is "more prominent" than the Launcher function, which Ibrahim just made up. There is a sense in which the Dual function is higher energy than the Launcher function in Model G: the Launcher and Control functions (which are 1-dimensional in Model G) function primarily by stimulus-response triggers, so they are the least flexible functions with the lowest degree of freedom of action. The Implementation and Dual functions, on the other hand, have the ability to proactively optimize themselves for the situation and use just the amount of energy needed to solve the problems given to them by the Program function (1st function).

"How the types actually work" just demonstrates that Ibrahim needs to study more epistemology in order to make successful and useful criticism of this sort. "The types" aren't the same thing in SHS or Model G as they are in Ibrahim's model, even if perhaps they have similar aspirations in what they are trying to account for with your typology (although even here there is probably significant divergence).

Most “paradigm clashes” are usually deemed “incommensurable”—meaning there is no way for the two paradigms to fit together—but this is so only because people focus on the phenomena, not the practices. But if we realize that phenomena are enacted, brought forth, and disclosed by practices, then we realize that what appeared to be “conflicting phenomena” or experiences are simply different (and fully compatible) experiences brought forth by different practices. Adopt the different practices, and you will see the same phenomena that the adherents of the supposedly “incommensurable” paradigm are seeing. - Ken Wilber

The point is that Ibrahim "types" people by sorting them into certain categories based on observing certain things about them that he believes have systematic meaning. This can only be approximately true (precise up to a point), and it can't account for things you don't already know or aren't already paying attention to. SHS observes people and uses DIFFERENT criteria to sort them into categories that have somewhat different meanings, and they don't type people as the same thing as Ibrahim so when you talk about how the types work you aren't talking about the same people in many cases. What I'm not saying is that everyone is equally right: it is possible for one model to be significantly more inclusive of information and have more fidelity in its observations in comparison to another model. However, to demonstrate that, you have to get past the theoretical structure that holds the observations together (which is at best an abstraction of the phenomenon that imperfectly accounts for its observations), and you have to look at the particular observations that are motivating the abstraction and only then can you see which model is more inclusive and has more fidelity to the observations at the heart of the practice. What doesn't work is taking the structure that you use to account for your typology and apply it so literally and simplistically to reality as to say: your structure is inconsistent with mine, and my structure is successful/correct, so therefore your structure is wrong! That is a pretty precise paraphrase of Ibrahim's argument. The problem is that your structure isn't just successful or correct in a binary way; it is a map of significantly more complex territory that is successful up to a point, but it can't ever guarantee that there aren't systematic patterns in that territory that you haven't observed yet which might better approximate the phenomena that you are trying to describe with your model. Therefore, this criticism by Ibrahim amounts to little more than a kind of literalist and fundamentalist adherence to a structure that there is some personal attachment to. It is a completely inadequate epistemological point of view for a scientist or any kind of serious researcher. I previously made a claim that baffled him which he claimed to take issue with, when he claimed that Model G was "demonstrably wrong":

However, given your views on epistemology that rely so uncritically on mathematical structure combined with the much harder to demonstrate and much less clear semantic content that you believe in which the structure is really just a shield for, I don’t have high hopes for your demonstration. -me

This is precisely how Ibrahim is trying to critique Model G. He is trying to avoid the more complex and fundamental discussion of observations and semantic meaning that we try to approximate with our structure (which might actually get somewhere and be interesting) by just pointing that the structure of Model G is different from the structure that he uses (paraphrasing him: the types JUST don't work this way, the suggestive function isn't this way compared to the mobilizing, etc.). In order to compare incommensurable structures like Model A and Model G, you can't just focus on the contradictions in the structures since that doesn't address the different practices and different scopes of observations that disclose those structures in the first place. Sure, the structures do contradict each other, but it's not that simple because the structures aren't taking the same information into account, and there's no guarantee that they're taking information into account at the same level of fidelity and inclusiveness. Until that more fundamental comparison of observations and practices is done, no comparison is really taking place between the models and there's really just a lack of communication.

Attempted Criticism 3 is Ibrahim's most fundamental critique of Model G which reveals his basic viewpoint. From now, this point of view adumbrated by Ibrahim is going to be called Model A Structural Fundamentalism. And as I've already demonstrated, this Model A structural fundamentalism is beneath the ability to be taken seriously. These views are intolerant, tyrannical and almost shockingly naive about the limits of our knowledge.

Ibrahim does treat us to a rare Model G compliment, although he drags his feet a little bit so he can try to belabor what he judges to be errors of Ben Vaserlan:

Model G does, however, have a few selected insights. One is the greater emphasis on the benefit rings, or rather, the bold/cautious dichotomy. Another is the idea of "energy." For some reason Ben flounders in this video when asked to define energy, while he had previously connected it to Jung's concept of libido (not Freud's), which Jung defined as a kind of "life force". This is a sound idea in itself: Model A addresses information processing (information metabolism) but it does not address the obvious limitations of resources that apply to each function's processing, in particular the strength and boldness traits.

 -Attempted Criticism 4: "Unfortunately, beyond this very basic outline, the details of Model G seem disconnected with the reality of the types — including which functions are supposedly maximum energy, etc."

What Ibrahim judges to be "the reality of the types" is at best an approximation afforded to him by his model. He does not have privileged access to the reality of the types unless he can demonstrate, in detail, why his model more inclusively and with greater fidelity accounts for the range of typological observations that you can make about people. And that's a task he hasn't even begun.  The approach that he takes is a fundamentally unproductive ideological approach and is the sort of rhetoric used by members of different ideologies to talk past one another and never resolve anything.  They use their own structural ideology to not ever hear what the other person is saying just because they won't listen to what doesn't already fit into the structure of their ideology.  "Your views don't fit into my ideology, so you're wrong".

It is certainly true that Gulenko's views on what types are maximum energy, etc., wouldn't apply well to Ibrahim's diagnostic categories.  But to give that as the reason why Model G is wrong is literally no better than saying: I'm right, so you're wrong.  Or to put it even more simply, Ibrahim's criticism is no better than: "no u". The real salient issue, which Ibrahim never does anything but try to dodge, is why his model more inclusively, and with more fidelity, better takes into account the typological observations that you can make about people.

-Attempted Criticism 5: "That's a very brief take on the semantics — the details are really not that interesting and are addressed in the video."

Actually I find the details of Model G vastly more interesting than those of Model A. Who cares how "interesting" you personally find it?  But Ibrahim is simply wrong that the debate between Ben Vaserlan and Jack addressed almost any of the details of Model G.  I say that as one of the only 3 people in the entire Western World to have taken an actual class with Victor Gulenko on Model G.  In that debate between Jack and Ben, there was not significant discussion of:

-the properties of the functions in Model G

-the dimensions of the functions in Model G

-the relationships between the functions in Model G

-the meta functions

-the nature of the blocks

-how the functions apply to the types concretely

This just seems like another attempt by Ibrahim to dodge the work of making a real, constructive criticism.

-Attempted Criticism 6: "The real point of this post is the structural deficit which I pointed out and Jack later mentioned in the debate. It's very obvious if you look at Andrew's diagrams (and translate the names and numbers accordingly): As you can see here, some of the standard socionic dichotomies are presented asymmetrically in Model G. Gulenko apparently does not assign any meaning to the left and right sides of the model, he still uses the standard dichotomies such as strong/weak, etc., albeit with different names, as displayed on the right here. Strong/weak becomes "master/slave" and valued/subdued becomes "values/tools"."

Again there is so much wrong with this, I have to wonder whether Ibrahim is even paying attention anymore.  First of all, he's technically wrong: while strong/weak does correlate to master/slave in that chart, valued/subdued DOES NOT correlate with values/tools (rather inert/contact correlates with values/tools, so he didn't even follow his own directions).  To demonstrate this much incompetence in a serious critique of Model G you'd have to be carelessly lazy since it just makes you look like you have no idea what you're talking about, but it may not amount to much in this case because Gulenko doesn't focus much on these Model G functional dichotomies.  He's proposed some semantics for them, but I don't think master/slave is a good name for example, and the semantics could certainly be refined since they aren't deeply connected to practice.

The actual point Ibrahim is making doesn't seem to be a "criticism" proper, but a mere preference.  He prefers that each of the individual functional dichotomies have a symmetry between the left and right sides of the model.  However, he presents no argument why this must be the case, why it'd be beneficial, or how it's connected with any practical result of the model.  As an analogy, his criticism is as ridiculous as claiming that there's a problem with theoretical physics because protons and neutrons don't have the same amount of up quarks and down quarks.  If you zoom out of the individual functional dichotomies, then the system still has a symmetry, but the symmetry breaks over some of the dichotomies.  While that might not fit neatly into some mathematical model that Ibrahim would like to apply, it doesn't seem to present any practical and relevant concern to the application of the theory, nor does it seem to be inherently internally inconsistent.  If he wants to respond to this point, he needs to show on a practical level why the symmetries that he prefers to exist in each dichotomy on the left and right sides of the model need to be maintained.

Really though, this is little more than a rehash of criticism 3: Model A Structural Fundamentalism.  In other words, for him: if it doesn't fit into the abstract structure he's already decided on (with no reasoning as to why this structure must be used), then it's wrong.  Now you can see even more of the dynamics of how outrageous these views are.  This next bit is quite rich: I told Ibrahim that Gulenko does assign a meaning to the left and right sides of the model that Ibrahim just assumed that he didn't, so he tried to take another vague definition of them in order to prove that they are still no more than vague jargon:

-Attempted Criticism 7: "(correction: It is said that Gulenko does consider the left-hand functions to be "better" in the "sense [...] of energy allocation to the function and the degree of freedom of behavior afforded by this." Again, more jargon which does not seem to apply to the suggestive function, or if not actually wrong, at least is not as clear as the existing Model A dichotomies.)"

The comment Ibrahim cites here is correct, but it's not a precise account of the dimensions.  It's just a general account of how the functions are stronger in an energetic sense the more on the left of the chart that they are.  One such definition is given on the most popular reference material on my entire blog that Ibrahim obviously didn't read:

-Energomaksimum: The Program (1) and demonstrative (5) functions are energetically strong, taking the lion's share of the total energy consumption of the socionic object. “Strong gas, but weak brake (+ -)”
-Energy Optimum: Implementation (2) and Dual (6) are functions that take as much energy as is needed to solve the current problem. "Strong gas and strong brake (+ +)", the most controlled functions
-Energominimum: Role (3) and Brake (7) are functions that support the functioning of the socionic object at the lower energy level. “Strong brake, but weak gas (- +)”
-Energopessimum: Laucher (4) and Control (8) - functions convulsively spending residual energy only as a last resort

And even that is just one of several parallel descriptions of the dimensions in Model G.  Ibrahim hasn't even got his feet wet in terms of learning about Model G yet, but he's already writing a post about how to fix it.  And once again, we hear that Model G doesn't apply to the suggestive function, by which Ibrahim means the suggestive function in his own model.  So again, this is Model A Structural Fundamentalism: if it doesn't fit into my model, then it's wrong.  These are some ultra-partisan views that are not compatible with unbiased inquiry.

-Attempted Criticism 8: "How can we fix this? The obvious thing to do would be to simply switch the suggestive and ignoring functions (or "manipulative" and "control", numbers 6 and 8). Then the left side is strong and the right side is weak. And the valued functions are "outside" and subdued "inside", which is at least as good as it is in Model A. And we still have the benefit rings proceeding horizontally: NeTeSeFe... and TiNiFiSi...."

Basically, the switches Ibrahim is advocating would make Model G closer to Ibrahim's model, and thus better.  Yet again, this is an example of Model A Structural Fundamentalism.  There are several reasons why switching the Dual and Control functions won't work in Model G: one is that the Control function is actually one-dimensional in Model G, and therefore it would be out of place in the Energo-Optimum block and the Self-Affirmation block.  The Dual function, by contrast, is 3 dimensional, and so would be out of place in the Energo-Pessimum block and the Inflation block.  The dual function has multiple modes that it switches flexibly between (provocative behavior, deprived behavior, and satisfied behavior), so it is not stuck in the dilemma of the Inflation block functions that accumulate information in the absence of being able to do much about it by shifting their mode of action.  The Dual function is not stuck in the 1 dimensional "on" position of constantly tracking the environment like the Control function is.

However, there's a larger technical problem with the change suggested by Ibrahim: it doesn't preserve the signs (or "spins") of the functions.  In Model G what has been observed is that the type primarily uses the functions of its "spin" (process/result, or evolutionary/involutionary), while only occasionally reverting to the opposite spin.  And he flipped the Seeker Model G chart to have TiNiFiSi on the bottom ring, so he's flipped the spin of the functions: it goes from +Ti -Si +Fi -Ni (the Inspector, who the ILE supervises), to -Ti +Ni -Fi +Si (the Analyst, the mirror type for the Seeker).  This contradicts the empirical behavior of the types with their signed functions, it ignores that the transition between certain functions represented by those very signs, and it destroys the supervision rings which are also represented in the model.  Instead of having a model with preserved signs in benefit and supervision rings, in Ibrahim's proposal you get this interference between the process and result rings in the same types and the ring is prevented from continuing at scale.

-Attempted Criticism 9: "In my opinion this clearly shows that the Model G blocks are defined wrong. The issue is that Gulenko wanted to have a benefit loop of types, but he represented them using the standard Model A ego blocks (as the columns of Model G). So for ILE we have NeTi, then TeSi, then SeFi and FeNi for the ILE and its Process-Extrovert ring. Instead we should express the types entirely in terms of the benefit ring (in analogy with how it is in Model A and the supervision ring) with each represented using a consecutive pair of elements in the ring, ILE being NeTe, LSE being TeSe, etc. Then the types can be thought of as "edges" between the IM elements, and they interact at their shared points. This makes much more sense if Model G is meant to show energy flow, does it not? Ben made the interesting point (possibly the only one he made in the entire video) that Model G includes not only benefit rings, but also supervision rings if you extend it vertically. Note that this property still holds if we switch the suggestive and ignoring functions. There are literally only two ways to make a grid like this, and Model G does not use the right choice. Aside from the semantic issues with Model G, this is a very obvious structural flaw. Fixing it might be the first step to salvaging the model."

Model G actually doesn't only represent the Model A ego blocks for the types.  It has BOTH the ego block (vertically) and the benefit ring block between the Base and Demonstrative Model A elements (horizonally).  So in fact, it does show the energy flow of NeTe (for the Seeker) already, AND it shows the informational supervision relationship NeTi (for the Seeker).  Both of these were intended, so there is no need to choose one over the other (and does Ibrahim really not see that NeTe, TeSe, etc. are already represented in the chart and that Gulenko emphases this Social Mission block frequently?  This just seems like more careless inattention by Ibrahim).  The types can already be thought of as analogous to their signed Program function, which already implies the rest of their Model G chart (extended horizontally and vertically, +Ne supervises +Ti, it has an order relationship with -Te, etc.), and Model G already shows energy flow with its signed functions.

Ibrahim is technically wrong that the Supervision rings are still represented if you switch the Dual and Control functions.  What you have in that case is the Seeker over its mirror type, the Analyst.  Mirror is a symmetrical relationship, not a ring (in group theory, it has an order of 2, whereas the ring relationships of Benefit and Supervision have an order of 4), so it will just flip back and forth between the Seeker and the Analyst rather than represent a ring as was intended.  And the signs of many of the information elements would switched, and have the wrong cognitive style, etc.  For example, the Seeker's Social Mission would be +Ne and +Te according to Ibrahim, but this contradicts the behavior of the Seeker in practice (where -Te is the Implementation function and connects it to the Administrator, not to the Entrepreneur).  Not only has Model G not chosen incorrectly here; it seems that Ibrahim has chosen incorrectly in his bizarre zeal to correct Model G (a model he has been demonstrated never to have studied in the first place).  Really, it seems like he just wants to either discredit Model G, or have it become more similar to the models he already uses.  Model G made the most reasonable choice to account for the empirical behavior it is observing on the functions that differs from any interpretation of Model A, and it made the choice to preserve the rings and the signs of the functions which are broken by Ibrahim's self-serving suggestion.

Not contained in his article, there is another "criticism" of Model G that Ibrahim has been touting recently, so I might as well address that here as well:

-Attempted Criticism 10: "I honestly don't care what Gulenko calls the functions, it was stupid to rename them by switching names, it's like he's intentionally trying to confuse people. there is no reason to call the demonstrative function the creative function and vice versa. if you're going to come up with a new model and rename everything, at least come up with some better names than already exist. Gulenko squandered that opportunity. I don't think the 8th function is used in an especially "creative" way. if anything, the lead function is used the most creatively."

Does Ibrahim actually have any idea what he's calling stupid?  If he doesn't, then doesn't that seem kind of stupid?  Let's consider the behavior of the Demonstrative function in Model G from my aforementioned reference post:

Demonstrative function: Introduction contrary to local conditions, a sudden-impulse action that attracts the attention of observers

That is to say, in Model G, the Demonstrative is actually demonstrative in nature.  That's its literal purpose.  Whereas in Model A, the Demonstrative function is more subtle and relied on in the "background", almost the opposite of demonstrative.  That's why I proposed the name "Background function" for the 8th function in Model A, because the Demonstrative function never made sense as a name in Model A.  So it seems that Ibrahim has it backwards, in terms of who is fixing what.  The Creative function is just one name for the 2nd function in Model G.  It is not my favorite name (and not Gulenko's favorite anymore), because even though it is creative (due to its flexibility in adapting to the local conditions), the functions in the Self-Affirmation block also have an arguably creative nature.  Therefore, we've often been calling the 2nd function in Model G the Tool function, or the Implementation function, which gives a more unique sense of how it is used relative to the other functions (and especially relative to the Social Mission of the type).  It doesn't make sense to say that Gulenko "squandered an opportunity", because he has infinite opportunities to rename the functions.  Ibrahim seemingly created this false sense of scarcity and alarm here so he can get angry or contemptuous at something.  Ibrahim does seem to be implicitly acknowledging that the topic of names is important though.  And if that's true, then he's admitting the names of Model A are flawed (e.g. "if anything, the lead function is used the most creatively"), yet he's not doing anything to change that.  So maybe it's Ibrahim that is squandering an opportunity to make a change.

It's not surprising that the 8th Model A function isn't creative in Ibrahim's opinion (he types himself as an LII), because his Ni in fact does not appear to be the 2nd function in Model G since it appears to be in a relatively inflexible launcher position.  This is corroborated by this 1st function in Model G appearing to be the technical, formal, convergent and causal-determinist logic of +Ti, fixed by the rigidity of Demonstrative Se.  Though this is not a formal typing, I struggle to see how Ibrahim is an Analyst in Model G (even though I used to think he was LII when I knew less about it), so he is probably one of those who does not translate well between models (in my opinion though, that's due more to the limitations of Model A, but that's for another discussion).

Conclusion:

Even if Model A is more correct than Model G, then Ibrahim's Model A Structural Fundamentalism makes for an extremely poor representative of Model A that is likely to actually discourage other models from progressing to the supposedly (but not demonstrated) superiority of Model A.  Model A Structural Fundamentalism holds everyone back:

-it holds Ibrahim back from developing a sense of the limits of our knowledge, and from engaging with other models to learn from or improve them

-it holds Model A supporters back because it may be pushing away new allies and directions

-it holds Model G supporters back because the superiority of Model A is so poorly explained that they would have to be forgiven for thinking that it hasn't considered the obvious epistemological issues that I'm raising

I can't believe I have to say this, but: you can't refute (or contribute to) Model G with Model A Structural Fundamentalism.